Identifying Plausible Harmful N-k Contingencies: A Practical Approach based on Dynamic Simulations by Weckesser, Johannes Tilman Gabriel & Van Cutsem, Thierry
 
 
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright 
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
 Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
 You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
 You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal 
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
  
 
   
 
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Apr 01, 2019
Identifying Plausible Harmful N-k Contingencies: A Practical Approach based on
Dynamic Simulations
Weckesser, Johannes Tilman Gabriel; Van Cutsem, Thierry
Published in:
Proceedings of  20th Power System Computation Conference
Link to article, DOI:
10.23919/PSCC.2018.8442654
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Weckesser, J. T. G., & Van Cutsem, T. (2018). Identifying Plausible Harmful N-k Contingencies: A Practical
Approach based on Dynamic Simulations. In Proceedings of  20th Power System Computation Conference
IEEE. DOI: 10.23919/PSCC.2018.8442654
Identifying Plausible Harmful N-k Contingencies: A
Practical Approach based on Dynamic Simulations
Tilman Weckesser
Center for Electric Power and Energy (CEE)
Technical University of Denmark (DTU)
Lyngby, Denmark
jtgw@elektro.dtu.dk
Thierry Van Cutsem
Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS)
at the University of Lie`ge
Lie`ge, Belgium
t.vancutsem@uliege.be
Abstract—This paper presents a practical search algorithm
using detailed dynamic simulations to identify plausible harmful
N − k contingency sequences. Starting from an initial list of
contingencies, progressively more severe contingency sequences
are investigated. For that purpose, components, which violated
conservative protection limits during a N − k contingency
simulation are identified and considered as candidate k+ 1-th
contingencies, since these could be tripped due to a hidden
failure. This approach takes into account cascading events, such
as over- or under-speed generator tripping, which are considered
to be part of the system response. The implementation of the
proposed algorithm into a parallel computing environment and its
performance are demonstrated on the IEEE Nordic test system.
Index Terms—N-k contingencies, cascading events, protection
hidden failures, time-domain simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The integration of distributed generation from fluctuating
energy sources and delays in the reinforcement of the grid,
due to e.g. public objection, result in more frequent operation
of the power system closer to its limits. This may trigger
cascading events, due to e.g. component overloading. In order
to ensure uninterrupted power delivery, system protection
designers need to develop effective, automatic emergency con-
trol schemes (also referred to as System Integrity Protection
Schemes - SIPS) against those events, which are rare but have
a large impact. For that purpose, identification of plausible and
harmful N − k contingency sequences is crucial.
Due to the large number of possible contingencies and their
combinations, identification of harmful N − k contingency
sequences with brute force approaches is infeasible.
In [1], the IEEE Cascading Failure Working Group con-
cludes that the mechanims and the details, which need to be
modeled in cascading failure studies, are not yet understood
and, hence, further research is needed.
One approach for identifying plausible cascading events is
based on the simulation of an initial fault and the subsequent
construction of a cascading event tree involving plausible
outages. These cascading outages can for example be caused
by hidden failures, which have played a key role in many
catastrophic power system failures [2] and can be due to
outdated protection settings, equipment failure or undue trip-
ping of overloaded equipment. The approach of constructing
a cascading event tree is for example used in [2], [3] and
[4]. Probabilities are assigned to the individual events and a
branch of the tree is explored until the probability of the event
sequence falls below a pre-defined threshold or unacceptable
system conditions are identified.
In [5], a new vulnerability index was proposed and used
to determine the degree of vulnerability of transmission lines
and sections in a power system. For that purpose, Fault Chain
theory from the field of Security Sciences is applied.
An approach for identifying minimal N − k contingencies
triggering large cascading failures based on a “Random Chem-
istry” algorithm was proposed in [6]. Based on the observa-
tion that a relatively small number of components contribute
disproportionately to system vulnerability, the general idea is
to randomly pick a large set of contingencies S0 causing
cascading failures and find the smallest subset, which still
causes system failure. If a randomly selected subset triggers
cascading failures, then it replaces the larger set S0. This
procedure is repeated until a subset with the desired size kmax
is found. To further reduce its size and identify a minimum
number of contingencies to cause system failure, a pruning
approach is used, which removes individual contingencies
from the subset and simulates it.
A data driven approach was proposed in [7]. The method
utilizes data from many cascading failure simulations to de-
termine an influence graph. This graph provides information
on how cascades evolve in a particular system and allows to
identify modifications that will reduce cascade propagation.
In [8] the method for identifying high risk N−k contingen-
cies is based on a graph. Functional groups are defined, which
are made up of components that are operating and failing to-
gether, due to the connection structure and protection scheme.
Moreover, interfacing components are defined as breakers and
open switches. In the resulting graph, the nodes are functional
groups and the edges are interfacing components. Then, rare
event approximation and event trees are used to determine
high-risk N − k contingencies.
The approach proposed in [9] relies on pattern recognition
and fuzzy estimation for on-line identification of an event
sequence, which may lead to catastrophic failure. For that
purpose, probable contingency sequences are investigated off-
line using power flow computations and then the results are
utilized on-line to identify a critical collapse sequence.
Lastly, the authors of [10] evaluated a number of existing
methods for real-time applications.
In this paper, an extended, generalized and improved version
of the N − k search algorithm presented in [11], is proposed.
While in [11] plausible harmful N −k contingency sequences
were identified based on comparison of steady-state values, in
this paper identification of plausible contingencies is based on
detailed dynamic time simulations.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, the search algorithm, its implementation into a
parallel processing environment as well as its modification
under consideration of limited computational resources are
presented. Results obtained from simulations of the IEEE
Nordic Test System are shown in Section III. Finally, some
concluding remarks are offered in Section IV.
II. SEARCH APPROACH FOR IDENTIFYING PLAUSIBLE
HARMFUL N-K CONTINGENCIES
A. Detailed procedure
In Fig. 1, a flow chart of the proposed algorithm is pre-
sented. The grey dashed blocks are only considered when
limited computational resources are available, which will be
discussed in Section II-E. As an input the proposed approach
receives a time-domain model of the power system and an
initial list of contingency sequences. A contingency sequence
Ci consists of one or more individual contingencies, such
as generator or transmission line outages. The power system
model includes models of protective relays, which monitor
certain quantities and disconnect components to avoid e.g.
under- or over-speed of synchronous machines, overloading
of transmission lines, etc. Consequently, the system response
to an applied contingency sequence may include Cascading
Events (CEs), such as transmission line tripping triggered by
power system protections, as defined in [12]. It should be noted
that cascading events in terms of tripping of components, cor-
respond to intentional interventions of the protection systems.
The procedure is as follows. L is a list of N−k contingency
sequences, which contains all sequences to be investigated.
The length of the list is changing, since new plausible con-
tingency sequences are added, and assessed sequences are
removed. The list L is initialized with the aforementioned
contingency sequences. While the list is not empty the next
entry Ci is extracted. Then, a time-domain simulation is
performed starting from the initial system operating point and
the individual contingency cm ∈ Ci are applied consecutively,
separated with a short-delay ∆t, or at pre-defined times.
During the simulation, system states are monitored and the
simulation is terminated, if an instability is identified or a
new steady-state operating point is reached. If the contingency
sequence Ci led to an instability, it is stored in the list of
unstable contingencies Lu and, if the new steady-state is non-
viable, then it is added to the list Lw of contingency sequences
leading to weak operating conditions. On the other hand, if the
system remained stable after Ci was applied, the final steady
state is viable and ki (the number of individual contingencies
in Ci) is smaller than a pre-defined maximum number kmax,
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Figure 1. Flow chart of the search algorithm. Functions in grey dotted boxes
are introduced in Section II-E
then it is checked whether candidate ki + 1-th contingencies
were identified during the simulation (see Section II-B).
Based on the contingencies, candidate N − (ki + 1) contin-
gency sequences are derived. If both questions hereafter are
answered in the negative, the candidate sequences are added
to the list L:
• Does the candidate N−(ki+1) sequence contain exactly
the same individual contingencies as an already assessed
N − kn sequence?
• Was a subset of individual contingencies of the candidate
N−(ki+1) sequence already found to result in instability
or non-viable operating condition?
In the above procedure, the contingency sequences are
treated as unordered sets, i.e. the order of the individual
contingencies in a sequence is neglected in the comparisons.
The described procedure is continued until all contingency
sequences in L were investigated and the list is empty.
B. Identification of candidate (k + 1)-th contingency
Certain components are monitored during the time-domain
simulation. Candidate (k + 1)-th contingencies may be trig-
gered by a Hidden Failure (HF), as defined in [13], in the
protection system. The HF causes the protected component to
be tripped although the monitored variable did not exceed the
associated protection limit. It should be emphasized that in
contrast to CEs, where a component is assumed to be tripped
due to violation of a limit, HFs cause unintentional trippings,
due to malfunctioning of protective relays.
Two examples are shown in Fig. 2. Figure 2a shows
the post-disturbance evolution of the field current ifd of a
generator equipped with an OverExcitation Limiter (OEL). In
normal operation, when ifd exceeds the limit ilimfd , the OEL
would limit it after a delay. However, an HF could cause the
generator to be tripped after a delay TOELl , when ifd exceeds
ti f d
ilimf d
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Figure 2. Visualization of identification of candidate k+1-th contingencies.
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Figure 3. Illustration of N − k search approach - Voltage evolution after
applying N − 1, N − 2 and N − 3 contingencies. (LTC: Load Tap Changer)
a value, which is by a factor of fOEL smaller than ilimfd . In
the proposed approach, a protected generator is flagged as
candidate (k + 1)-th contingency, when ifd remains above
the limit fOELilimfd for longer than T
OEL
l . In a subsequent
N − (k+1) contingency sequence, an outage of the generator
will be considered as a HF applied at the time tc defined in
Fig. 2a.
Similarly, a Distance Protection (DP) could trip the respec-
tive transmission line after a delay TDPl , when the measured
apparent impedance enters a protection zone, which is by a
factor of fDP larger than the actual zone (see Fig. 2b).
C. Illustrative example
In Fig. 3 an illustrative example of the proposed approach is
shown. First, an initial N − 1 contingency is simulated (green
solid curve). During the simulation, a component is flagged
and considered as HF1 in the N − 2 case (dashed and dotted
orange curve). A second component is flagged and considered
as HF2 in the N − 3 contingency (dashed red curve). This
results in a voltage collapse after triggering of a CE.
Note that all three curves coincide until the time of HF1,
while the orange and the red curves coincide until the time of
HF2.
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D. Implementation into a parallel computing environment
Since every Ci in L can be simulated and assessed individ-
ually, a parallel processing approach is proposed to speed up
the assessment. This is sketched in Fig. 4. A pool of workers is
set-up and initialized, whose number depends on the available
hardware. Some of the data such as the lists L, Lu, Lw and a
list of already simulated contingencies need to be accessed by
all workers. Hence, these are stored in shared memory which
all workers, one at a time, can access. After initialization, each
worker runs the part of the algorithm discussed in Section II-A,
which is inside the dashed box in Fig. 1.
E. Consideration of limited available computational resources
So far it was assumed that sufficient computational re-
sources were available to investigate all plausible contingency
sequences. However, if those resources are limited, then it is
preferable to first investigate the most harmful contingency
sequences. For that purpose, it is proposed to determine
the severity of each simulated stable N − ki case in terms
of a suitable severity index. Under the assumption, that a
subsequent N − (ki + 1) contingency sequence will further
deteriorate the system conditions, it is suggested to assign the
severity of the N − ki case to all the identified N − (ki + 1)
sequences. In order to first investigate the most severe cases,
the contingency sequences in the list L are sorted according
to the proposed index.
The severity index should be such that a higher value is
attributed to a situation which, under the effect of the next
disturbance, is more likely to degenerate into instability or
be subject to additional CEs. Various indices can be thought
of. In the simulations reported in this paper, it was chosen to
observe the final degradation of bus voltages, evaluated by the
following index:
si =
1
ki
∑
b∈B
[max(0, Vb(t0)− Vb(te))]2 (1)
where B is the set of all buses in the system or in the
area of interest, t0 the time before the first disturbance is
applied and te the time at the end of the simulation. It is
expected that a larger value of si corresponds to a more
severe situation. The max-function ensures that only buses are
Figure 5. One-line diagram of the IEEE Nordic test system [14]
considered, where the voltage magnitude has been depressed.
Moreover, the square of the deviation is used to increase
the weight of large deviations. Finally, in order to favour a
sequence with small number of contingencies and a breadth-
first search like inspection of the event tree, the sum of squared
voltage deviations is divided by the number of contingencies
ki applied to the system between times t0 and te.
This results in the introduction of the grey dotted boxes in
Fig. 1. In this version, if the simulation is stable and the final
operating point is viable, then the severity si is computed and,
after adding the new unique N−(k+1) contingency sequence,
the list L is sorted with respect to si.
It should be noted that, while this severity index is appropri-
ate for voltage instability, for angular or frequency instability
investigations, it may be necessary to consider a different
index.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. IEEE Nordic Test System
In this section, the Nordic test system, set up by the IEEE
Task Force on “Test Systems for Voltage Stability and Security
Assessment”, is used to demonstrate the performance of the
proposed N − k search algorithm. The detailed data as well
as the operating points can be found in [14]. A one-line
diagram is shown in Fig. 5. All MV loads are served through
distribution transformers equipped with LTCs. Contrary to [14]
the LTCs do not have constant tapping delays, but variable
delays with an inverse-time characteristic.
To simulate CEs and HFs, the following component protec-
tions were added.
1) Generator protection: All generators are protected with
a simple over-/under-speed protection relay and an under-
voltage protection relay.
a) Over-/under-speed protection: The protection trips the
respective generator instantaneously, if its rotor speed exceeds
±8 % of nominal value.
b) Under-voltage (UV) protection: The protection con-
siders two thresholds. If the terminal voltage drops below
0.9 pu, but stays above 0.8 pu, the generator is tripped with
a delay of 30 s. If the voltage falls below 0.8 pu, it is
disconnected instantaneously.
2) Transmission line protection: Each line is protected by a
distance protection relay. The settings of the relay are derived
based on the MVA capacity of the line and give a resistance
Rth and a reactance Xth threshold. If the resistance R and
reactance X calculated at any end of the protected line remain
inside the rectangle defined by (0, 0), (0, Xth), (Rth, Xth) and
(Rth, 0) longer than TDPl then the line is tripped (see Fig. 2b).
3) Identification of candidate (k + 1)-th contingencies:
In order to identify transmission lines, which are plausible
candidates for (k + 1)-th contingencies, the time TDPl was
chosen equal to 2.3 s and fDP was chosen equal to 3.5.
The corresponding factor fOEL for identifying candidate
generators was chosen equal to 0.95 and the time TOELl was
set to 0.5 s (see Fig. 2a). These factors and times were selected
to have a sufficient number of HFs and, hence, demonstrate
the method. Moreover, the chosen values were inspired by
discussions with two transmission system operators.
B. Operating points
The proposed method is tested on different operating points,
which are described in detail in [14].
• Operating point B: Operating Point (OP) B is a N − 1
secure operating point.
• Operating points B plus 50− 400 MW: Additional
six OPs are considered, where the loading of the Central
region (see Fig. 5) has been uniformly increased by a total
of 50, 100, 250, 300, 350 and 400 MW, respectively. This
leads to an increased power flow from the North to the
Central region and further stresses the system.
The initial list of contingencies contains all generators
(except g20, which is an equivalent accounting for the con-
nection to an external system) and all transmission lines. The
contingencies are applied as follows:
• generator: tripping at time t = 1.0 s
• transmission line: three-phase short-circuit close to one
end of the line at t = 1.0 s, cleared after 150 ms (t=1.15 s)
through tripping of the faulted line.
Up to three contingencies (kmax = 3) are considered.
It should be recalled that a N − 3 case consists of one
contingency from the initial list of contingencies plus two
hidden failures (HF1 and HF2), where HF1 was identified in
the preceding N − 1 case and HF2 in the preceding N − 2
case. Cascading events are considered to be part of the system
response and are not counted, when determining k.
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS WITH INCREASING LOADING LEVEL.
Operating Nb. of Unstable Non-
point simul. N − 1 N − 2 N − 3 all viable
B 411 0 31 67 98 4
B plus
395 3 32 53 88 2
50 MW
B plus
438 4 41 71 116 2
100 MW
B plus
368 9 47 43 99 6
250 MW
B plus
421 11 37 50 98 6
300 MW
B plus
479 11 53 67 131 6
350 MW
B plus
488 14 57 70 141 9
400 MW
A case is considered unstable, when the voltage at one bus
drops below 0.6 pu and remains below this threshold for at
least 500 ms. When an instability is detected the simulation
is terminated. The criterion for identification of a non-viable
operating point is as follows: in the final steady state the
voltage magnitudes of at least five buses lie below 0.85 pu.
C. Performance with sufficient computational resources
Table I gives an overview of the number of simulations,
identified unstable and non-viable cases for the various loading
levels. It can be observed that the number of unstable cases and
non-viable cases generally increases with the loading level.
While the original OP B is N − 1 secure, the number of
unstable N − 1 contingencies increases steadily up to 14
in OP B plus 400 MW. A decrease of the total number of
identified unstable cases after a loading increase, e.g. from
OP B to OP B plus 50 MW may be explained by the
simultaneous increase of N−1 and N−2 unstable cases. Each
additional unstable N−1 contingency results in the elimination
of all unstable N − 2 and N − 3 contingency sequences,
which contain this now unstable N−1 contingency. Similarly,
each new unstable N − 2 contingency sequence eliminates all
unstable N − 3 sequences of which this N − 2 contingency
sequence is a subset.
1) Example - unstable case - long-term voltage instability:
The procedure when identifying an unstable N−3 contingency
sequence is illustrated hereafter. Figure 6 shows the voltage
evolution at bus 1044, where an N − 3 contingency results in
unacceptably low voltages. The graph also shows the voltage
evolution in the preceding N − 1 and N − 2 case simulations.
The green solid curve is the voltage response, when only the
initial disturbance occurs, which is the loss of generator g14.
It can be observed that the contingency leads to a depressed
bus voltage with a final value of 0.933 pu. During the N-1
contingency simulation, the field currents of all generators
and the apparent impedance from all transmission lines are
monitored to identify a plausible second contingency. In this
case, the tripping of line 1011− 1013 was determined as one
plausible HF.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the corresponding apparent
impedance. The evolutions from the N − 1 and N − 2
simulations are presented. With fDPRth = 64.9 Ω, the
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Figure 6. Bus 1044 - Voltage evolution for N − 1, N − 2 and N − 3
contingency sequence identified with the proposed algorithm.
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resistance is from the beginning below this limit, while the
value of the reactance is still larger than fDPXth. After the
initial disturbance, the apparent impedance moves towards the
limit fDPXth and eventually crosses it at t = 36.5 s. Since it
remains below the threshold for longer than 2.3 s, it is flagged
as a candidate HF taking place at 38.8 s. Consequently, in a
subsequent N − 2 simulation, transmission line 1011 − 1013
is tripped as HF1 at t = 38.8 s. This case is shown by the
orange dashed-dotted curve in Figs. 6 and 7. The tripping of
the line results in a slightly more depressed voltage magnitude
at bus 1044 with a final value of 0.930 pu.
Also during the N − 2 contingency simulation, the field
currents of the generators and the apparent impedance in the
lines are monitored to identify a plausible second HF.
In Fig. 8, the evolution of the field current of generator g10
is shown extracted from the simulations of the N−1, N−2 and
N−3 contingency sequences. In the graph, the limit fOELilimfd
is indicated by the black dashed line. It can be observed that,
in the N − 1 contingency simulation (green solid curve), the
field current increases after the initial disturbance, but settles at
1.8 pu, which is below the limit fOELilimfd . The dashed-dotted
orange curve shows the field current evolution extracted from
the simulation of the N−2 contingency sequence. The tripping
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Figure 8. Generator g10 - Field current evolution for N − 1, N − 2 and
N − 3 contingency sequences identified with the proposed algorithm.
 0.75
 0.8
 0.85
 0.9
 0.95
 1
 1.05
 0  5  10  15  20
Initial contingency:
transmission line between 4011 and 4021 tripped
HF1:
generator g8 tripped
CE1-13: generators in the south and
 the central region tripped (UV)
(pu)
Time t (s)
1043
1045
4011
4072
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of line 1011 − 1013 (HF1) and the resulting degradation of
the operating condition require a further increase of the field
current of g10. Figure 8 shows that it exceeds the limit at
t=177.1 s. Since it remains above this limit, the generator g10
is marked as candidate third contingency after TOELl (0.5 s).
In a subsequent N − 3 contingency sequence simulation,
generator g10 is tripped as HF2, which corresponds to the
red dashed curve in Figs. 6 and 8.
In Fig. 6, it can be observed that this second HF leads to a
severe voltage drop at bus 1044. Subsequently, the system un-
dergoes two cascading events, namely under-voltage tripping
of generator g7 at 280.3 s and g6 at 303.3 s. Immediately after
the second CE a voltage collapse takes place.
2) Example - unstable case - rotor-angle instability:
Figure 9 shows the voltage evolution at selected buses in
another identified unstable N−2 case. The initial contingency
is the loss of the transmission line between buses 4011 and
4021. During the simulation of the corresponding N −1 case,
amongst other candidate contingencies, the loss of generator
g8 is identified as a plausible (k + 1)-th contingency. This
generator is not in the direct neighborhood of the first contin-
gency and the combination of those two contingencies would
probably not be considered from simple inspection of the
network graph. In Fig. 9, it can be observed that the initial
contingency plus HF1 cause severe degradation of the system
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Figure 10. Evolution of selected generator speeds in southern, central and
northern region.
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condition. Eventually this triggers 13 CEs, the under-voltage
tripping of all generators in the central and southern region.
The underlying instability mechanism is rotor-angle insta-
bility. Figure 10 shows the rotor speed evolution of selected
generators in the northern, central and southern region. The
generator separation is easily seen. The latter is responsible
for the 13 CEs mentioned above (i.e. the system already shows
instability before the generators are tripped).
3) Example - non-viable case: In the non-viable case illus-
trated hereafter, a contingency sequence leads to unacceptably
low final voltages at a number of buses, but no voltage
collapse. The voltage evolutions at selected buses are shown
in Fig. 11. The N − 2 contingency sequence consists of
the fault induced tripping of the first line 1041 − 1045 as
initial contingency followed by the outage of the second line
1041 − 1045 at 4.7 s as a HF. This series of contingencies
causes severe degradation of the system conditions and triggers
a cascading event (CE1) corresponding to the disconnection of
g7 by its under-voltage protection. As a result, a sharp decline
of the voltage magnitudes is experienced. While a collapse
is avoided, the voltage magnitudes settle at unacceptably low
values and the case is marked as non-viable. Consequently,
the search algorithm does not further expand this N − 2
contingency sequence.
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D. Simulation speed-up
As described in Section II-D, the proposed approach can
be implemented into a parallel computing environment. The
potential gain in speed-up achieved through parallelization was
investigated through repeated executions of the search algo-
rithm and variation of the number of utilized cores between 1
and 40. The simulations were performed on a 48-core AMD
Opteron Interlagos (CPU 6238 2.60 GHz, 128 GB RAM)
desktop computer running Debian Linux 6.
The initial operating point was in all cases OP B. Figure 12
shows the obtained run-times and speed-up ratios. It can be
observed that the run-time decreases from 2643 to 161 s, when
increasing the number of cores from one to 40. Moreover, the
graph shows that initially an almost linear speed-up can be
reached, e.g. with five cores the achieved speed-up is equal to
4.6. When further increasing the number of cores and, hence,
workers, a maximum speed-up of around 16 was reached,
when using 40 cores.
E. Performance with limited computational resources
In case that the available computational resources are insuf-
ficient to investigate all plausible contingencies, the severity
index si and the sorting of the contingency sequences in L,
as described in Section II-E, help first identifying the most
severe contingency sequences. In order to assess this feature
the number of identified unstable N − 2 (solid curve) and
N − 3 (dotted curve) contingency sequences as a function of
the number of performed simulations are shown in Fig. 13.
Operating point B was considered.
For the N − 2 cases, it can be observed that within the first
180 simulations (44 % of the total number of simulations)
87 % of the plausible unstable cases are identified by the
search algorithm. For the N −3 cases, it can be observed that
only after around 130 performed simulations, the first unstable
cases are found. This may be due to the proposed severity
index, which leads to first investigating potentially more severe
N−2 contingency sequences. However, when the first unstable
N − 3 contingency sequences are identified, their number
increases progressively and 72 % of the plausible unstable
N − 3 cases are found, after an additional 180 simulations.
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Figure 13. Number of identified unstable N−2 and N−3 cases as function
of number of performed simulations
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a practical search algorithm has been proposed
for identifying plausible harmful N−k contingency sequences.
It employs detailed dynamic time-domain simulations to assess
N−k contingency sequences, including cascading events, and
identify candidate (k+1)-th contingencies. Thus, progressively
more severe contingency sequences are assessed. In case
of limited computational resources, a severity index allows
to prioritize investigation of presumably severe contingency
sequences. For speed up of the procedure an implementation
into a parallel computing environment was presented.
The proposed method was tested on the IEEE Nordic Test
System and the results demonstrated an effective identification
of plausible harmful contingencies causing instability or a non-
viable system condition. It was demonstrated that the proposed
severity index enables earlier identification of harmful contin-
gency sequences and together with parallelization a speed-up
of up to 16 could be achieved.
In the future, it is envisioned to test the proposed approach
on larger systems. It will be extended to other hidden failures,
e.g. malfunctioning of generator under-voltage protection,
while alternative severity indices will be investigated.
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